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Civil Procedure:
How to Apply Diversity Jurisdiction in a Multiparty Case
Scott Dodson1
Compliance with the diversity requirements in multiparty cases
can be difficult to determine. Diversity actions make up more than a
third of the federal docket, and multiparty and multiclaim diversity
suits are common, yet many of these cases in fact lack complete
diversity.2
One nettlesome but unsettled complication of the requirement of
complete diversity (that all plaintiffs must be diverse in citizenship
from all defendants) can be illustrated simply. Consider a suit in
federal court in which a single plaintiff from Texas asserts separate
$1 million state-law claims against each of two defendants—one
from California and the other from Texas. Obviously, the federal
court lacks diversity jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim against the
nondiverse Texas defendant, and thus lacks diversity jurisdiction
over the action as a whole. But does the court nevertheless have
jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim against the diverse California
defendant? If no, then the court must dismiss the entire case. If yes,
the court could dismiss the nondiverse claim and proceed with the
diverse claim.
The Theories of Joint Jurisdiction and Several Jurisdiction
The answer to the question requires consideration of two
seemingly irreconcilable theories of subject-matter jurisdiction. The
first—“joint jurisdiction”—holds that diversity is determined jointly,
such that the presence of a jurisdictional spoiler contaminates other
claims in the action, depriving the federal court of diversity
jurisdiction over any diverse claims as well. Opinions from the U.S.
Supreme Court dating from as far back as 1824 seem to support this

1. Summarized and excerpted from Scott Dodson & Philip A.
Pucillo, Joint and Several Jurisdiction, 65 DUKE L.J. 1323 (2016).
2. See, e.g., United Republic Ins. Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 315
F.3d 168, 171 (2d Cir. 2003) (“We have previously expressed a concern that
cases brought in federal courts in which diversity of citizenship is not
properly alleged and/or does not exist are far too common.”).
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theory: Strawbridge v. Curtiss,3 Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v.
Kroger,4 and Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.5 all
assume that the presence of a nondiverse jurisdictional spoiler
contaminates the whole case under the complete-diversity rule.
The second—“several jurisdiction”—is that although the court
cannot proceed with the case as long as the jurisdictional spoiler
remains, the court always had, and continues to have, jurisdiction
over the diverse claim. In other words, the jurisdictional status of the
claims is determined severally, on a claim-by-claim basis. A separate
tradition of Supreme Court decisions dating back at least to 1825
seems to support this theory: Carneal v. Banks,6 Conolly v. Taylor,7
Horn v. Lockhart,8 and Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain9 all
suggest that spoiling claims may be individually dismissed to allow a
court to exercise jurisdiction over claims between remaining diverse
parties.
The tension resulting from the Supreme Court’s longstanding
endorsement of both joint jurisdiction and several jurisdiction in
conjunction with the complete-diversity rule invites resolution. But
because each tradition boasts substantial support in the caselaw,
merely picking one over the other—as has been the typical response
in the literature—proves unappealing.
The Way Out: The Time-of-Filing Rule
The way out of this conundrum is by employing the ability to
shift the time of jurisdictional assessment from the time of filing to a
later point in the litigation. With slight tweaking, this approach
largely preserves both traditions.
The usual timing rule—the so-called “time-of-filing rule”—
requires federal subject-matter jurisdiction to be assessed as of the
time of filing (or removal).10 In other words, if complete diversity
exists at the time of filing, then the court has subject-matter
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
437 U.S. 365 (1978).
545 U.S. 546 (2005).
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 181 (1825).
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 556 (1829).
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 570 (1873).
490 U.S. 826 (1989).
Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824).
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jurisdiction even if subsequent events cause diversity to be lacking
later in the case.
But this timing rule, unlike more rigid jurisdictional rules, is
amenable to modifications and exceptions.11 The time of
jurisdictional assessment can be shifted away from the time of filing
to a later stage of the litigation, such as the moment after the
dismissal of a nondiverse party. This approach allows for a shift from
the time of filing to the time of cure of the jurisdictional defect,
thereby transforming several jurisdiction into joint jurisdiction at a
different time. Evaluating complete diversity as of that later time is
consistent with joint jurisdiction because, as of the time any
nondiverse party has been dropped, the case as a whole fulfills the
complete-diversity requirement.
The upshot of this use of the time-of-jurisdictional-assessment
rule is that it makes the joint-jurisdiction cases’ theory of diversity
consistent with outcomes in the several-jurisdiction cases. Although
the several-jurisdiction cases do not expressly rely upon manipulation
of the time-of-filing rule to account for their holdings, they could be
understood to have done so implicitly.
Some limitations on facile manipulation of the time-ofjurisdictional-assessment rule should exist. For example, a court
should not recognize incomplete diversity and yet continue to
adjudicate the case on the possibility that, later, a cure will occur. A
known, clear jurisdictional defect without immediate cure requires
dismissal of the entire case under joint jurisdiction.
But while a defect remains unknown or uncertain, a court can
proceed. And when the court is forced to reassess its jurisdiction, the
court has the authority to dismiss the spoiling parties (if possible) and
assess complete diversity at the time of dismissal, thereby preserving
jurisdiction over the remaining diverse parties.
Conclusion
By shifting the time of jurisdictional assessment from the time of
filing to the time of cure of the jurisdictional defect, a federal court
can remain faithful to the established tradition of joint jurisdiction
while securing the finality, efficiency, and other good outcomes that
would be available under several jurisdiction.
11. Caterpillar v. Lewis, Inc., 519 U.S. 61 (1996).

